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Abstract. Ever since the impacts of the shale 
gas revolution in the US have unfolded their 
measurable effects – as significantly declining 
natural gas prices – impressive euphoria 
among those states which are identified to bear 
high potentials of unconventional gas is widely 
spread. As for Poland, essentially linked to the hope of profitably 
producing shale gas is the political will to strive for independ-
ence from Russian energy supply and thus, enhance energy 
supply security. Hence, liberalizing its gas market shall effective-
ly contribute to foster economic developments in the field of 
unconventional gas exploration and production. Moreover, 
attempts are made to encourage particularly foreign investors – 
for the reason of expertise – to enter the Polish gas market by 
amending and expanding legislation in favour of this develop-
ment. Legislation efforts, however, intend to preserve compre-
hensive governmental control capabilities. In addition, arising 
environmental concerns are being tried to handle either by cam-
paigns of clarification or political blockade to any legislation 
that potentially threatens the progress on unconventional gas in 
Poland. Poland not only faces crucial challenges in terms of 
diminished estimates on profitably recoverable shale gas vol-
umes but rather in terms of an escalating atmosphere of uncer-
tainty for investors – regarding the much criticised new legisla-
tion as well as an upcoming diminution of societal support. 
 
Keywords: energy, energy policy, fracking, hydraulic fracturing, 
natural gas, Poland, regulatory politics, shale gas, tax, unconven-
tional gas 
 
Authors: Stephanie Niemuth and Sophie Westphal are M.A. 
candidates in the European Management program at Technical 
University of Applied Sciences, Wildau, Germany. 
Introduction 
In a world heavily depending on resources – in fact, being ad-
dicted to them – the possession of resources is irrevocably linked 
to power. Resources are typically characterized by scarcity, 
which implies that there are only limited volumes and amounts 
available. This is what defines their value monetarily but also 
politically. Hence, a country being rich in resources is able to 
essentially dominate and direct political decision making pro-
cesses: Negotiation partners typically strive to achieve outcomes 
which are at best interests for all parties involved. However, as 
soon as economical disadvantages must be feared, the sustaina-
bility in defending an argument will certainly tend to weaken – 
although the fundamental interest itself might still be given. In 
consequence, resources enable a country to demonstrate political 
power. This rather general resource-power interdependency can 
thus be transferred to the issue of exploration and production of 
unconventional gas as follows: Strongly related to the discovery 
of unconventional gas is the political hope for energy independ-
ence as well as – in consequence – an increase in political power. 
With this in mind, the article shall illustrate the current status 
quo of unconventional gas exploration and production in the 
Republic of Poland. It points at the prospected socio-economic 
impacts and the legal framework applied, highlights the recent 
developments in terms of shale gas exploration and production, 
further outlines the relations between government and business 
and finishes with an analysis of the Polish way of dealing with 
upcoming opposition. The article concludes with an outlook on 
the potential future of shale gas in Poland.  
Anticipated Socio-Economic  
Impacts of New Gas Production 
The issue of unconventional gas and its related debate across 
Europe and within the European countries themselves, mainly 
results from an apparently successful production of unconven-
tional gas in the United States of America. This ‘shale gas revo-
lution’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 15) has impressingly contrib-
uted to the dropping of natural gas prices in the US (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2012: 15). The reason for this decline in prices can 
certainly be found in an increased independence from foreign gas 
supply and thus in an increased domestic production of natural 
gas. The Republic of Poland however in its natural gas consump-
tion is characterized by being strongly dependent on energy 
imports: Foreign supply meets 63% of the total consumption of 
natural gas (KPMG 2011: 38). Out of the overall natural gas 
imports approximately 90% are provided by just one supplier – 
which is Russian gas (KPMG 2012: 39).  
Moreover, with regards to the graph displayed below it can be 
clearly seen that there is a persistent tendency in an increasing 
demand for natural gas for consumption purposes over the past 
three decades. Since shortly after 1990 – after the breakdown of 
the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain – the develop-
ment of the natural gas consumption in Poland has more or less 
continuously soared. Periodic declines are mainly linked to eco-
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nomic crises – the last one in the years 2008/2009 and the global 
financial crisis (KPMG 2012: 40). 
In addition, Poland’s energy mix is commonly considered un-
satisfactory in terms of energy security (KPMG 2012: 39). Con-
cerns on energy security center particularly on the question of 
‘stable and continuous natural gas supply at competitive prices’ 
(Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 119). This, due to the fact mentioned 
before – where after 90% of the total natural gas imports is con-
stituted by Russian gas. It is argued that the risk of geopolitical 
factors in terms of gas supply stability will continue to exist: As  
for Poland, those risks arise from the fact that its natural gas is 
delivered via Belarus and partly Ukraine which each by them-
selves once in a while face conflicts with Russia (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 120). Hence, when Poland was assessed to bear 
the “most significant potential for shale gas” (Kosciuszko Insti-
tute 2011: 31) among Europe, Polish government considered this 
detection as the initial moment to ‘diversify (…) and expand the 
network of natural gas supply’ (KPMG 2012: 39). Proceeding 
from this general introduction to the Polish energy portfolio the 
abstract further points at prospected impacts of the gas market 
liberalization and the potential socio-economic costs and benefits 
- arising from the development of the shale gas extraction sector.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Poland natural gas consumption (1980-2012), in bil-
lion cubic feet.  Source: US Energy Information Administration 
(2013).  
Gas market liberalization 
The use of natural gas as a source for the primary energy within 
the Polish energy mix ranges in the third place. However, com-
pared to the share of coal and oil, the supply of natural gas is still 
relatively limited: In 2009 the share of natural gas of the total 
primary energy supply amounted to 12.7% only. 
Yet, in accordance with a continuously increasing demand in 
terms of natural gas consumption the prospected importance of 
natural gas is ‘predicted to grow significantly’ (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 119). Hence, liberalizing the Polish gas market 
appears to be most essential with regards to the development of a 
shale gas extraction sector. Efforts in this field mainly comprise a 
liberalization of prices and the establishment of a competitive 
market. 
As for the liberalization of prices, the Polish gas market can 
literally be characterized as a monopoly: The dominating compa-
ny PGNiG SA ‘exercises a monopoly over all links of the gas 
value chain’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 119) which – in conse-
quence – leads natural gas being subject to tariffs (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 121). Tariffs however, result in negative effects to 
occur: Using the profits from the domestic natural gas production 
to subsidise imports leads to the generation of end user prices 
below the market price. Therefore, a certain demand needs to be 
interpreted as artificial – such a demand hinders the economy to 
perceive price signals that are of essential importance to effi-
ciently allocate scarce resources (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
121). In addition, the mentioned pricing scheme results in 
PGNiG SA demonstrating rather low intentions to increase the 
domestic production of natural gas as this would certainly imply 
‘further subsidizing of imported gas rather than increasing its 
profits’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 121). On the contrary, due to 
the fact that the level of tariffs for gas is determined on the basis 
of costs, a distinct lack of motivation for PGNiG SA can be 
outlined to reducing those (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 121-122). 
Moreover, prices for the end user being lower than the market 
price, hardly generates signals of an attractive market. It thus 
prevents potential suppliers to enter the Polish gas market and for 
that reason further consolidates the existing monopoly (Kosci-
uszko Institute 2011: 121). 
Yet, liberalizing the domestic gas prices would lead to a more 
realistic demand and thus enforce suppliers to naturally set their 
prices as – competitively – low as possible, to maintain their 
supply volume (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 121).  
As for the establishment of a competitive market, this is as-
sumed to be achieved through a large number of entities operat-
ing on the Polish gas market – once the liberalization of prices 
has boosted its attractiveness (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 123). 
Generally, a large number of entities operating on one market 
represent an economic characteristic – a prerequisite in the Polish 
case – for a competitive market: Granting all market participants 
access to various suppliers certainly facilitates competition 
among them in order to succeed and persist on the respective 
market. With regards to an impressing number of companies 
operating in the unconventional gas exploration industry it is to 
be assumed that ‘there is no real danger of monopolization or 
cartelization aimed at fixing prices’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
123). In addition, prices observed on the New York Mercantile 
Exchange reveal the perfect competitiveness of the US market. 
Due to a similar structure of the unconventional gas exploration 
industry in Poland, these findings strongly indicate chances of an 
equal development possibly to take place in Poland as well (Kos-
ciuszko Institute 2011: 124).  
Hence, competition in general – may it among domestic or un-
der the presence of foreign suppliers – can be considered a pow-
erful ‘source of pressure’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 124) to 
enforce optimization and price competitiveness.  
In conclusion, the current way of dealing with gas imports as a 
rather political purchase – as it requires an intergovernmental 
agreement – leads to a pricing scheme that adds on an unquanti-
fiable element to the final gas price: The political factor. Thus, 
the real import costs are not known and can therefore not be 
made transparent (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 119). Promoting 
the ‘unconventional gas revolution’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
120) however can effectively contribute to develop a ‘competi-
tive and commercial gas market in Poland’ (Kosciuszko Institute 
2011: 120). This, in turn, will finally enable the market to apply 
to the principle of economic optimization (Kosciuszko Institute 
2011: 119).  
Socio-economic costs and benefits 
Besides highlighting the various benefits which ought to be 
arising from developing the unconventional gas exploration and 
production sector, this development also contains social costs 
that are likely to occur. In accordance with the experience made 
in the US, those issues to direct attention to mainly comprise: 
damaging of public transport infrastructure due to ‘heavy loads 
transported on trucks’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 13), noise and 
falling of prices for properties in neighbouring areas to industries 
or exploration and production of shale gas (Kosciuszko Institute 
2012: 13). Knowing about these social costs is inevitable for 
local communities as well its inhabitants to not only be aware of 
their rights but rather to be able to take over a distinct negotiation 
position with regards to claiming for compensation and other 
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benefits. In abstract six of this paper - Public Policy – the Polish 
government is putting politics ahead of every other business – a 
distinct focus will be put on issues in that field. However, it can 
be assumed that the socio-economic benefits to be expected in 
the affected drilling areas will generally exceed the incurred 
inconveniencies and costs (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 13).  
 As for the anticipated benefits, these mainly contain benefits 
arising from dropping gas prices as well as benefits affecting the 
local labour market. 
Irrevocably linked to the development of activities in terms of 
the unconventional gas sector is the expectation of a ‘reduction 
of natural gas prices’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 13). In the light 
of Poland facing the highest gas prices in Europe, a drop in pric-
es implies impacts of vital importance for the Polish economy in 
general: To satisfy an increasing demand for natural gas in the 
fields of energy, chemistry and private households, access to 
cheaper domestic gas must be made available and in turn, may 
positively influence the ‘dynamism of economic growth’ (Kosci-
uszko Institute 2012: 14) – which may moreover be reflected by 
a higher national GDP (Gross Domestic Product). In addition, the 
assumed dimensions of positive impacts of a development of the 
unconventional natural gas sector on the economy appear to be 
threefold: ‘direct, indirect and induced’ (Kosciuszko Institute 
2012: 14). Expanding the domestic production will require new 
gas power plants to be built or rather install combined heat and 
power plants. Those heat and power plants are typically based on 
the co-generation principle and therefore boost the energy effi-
ciency as electricity does not need to be transported far anymore 
(Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 14). In consequence, enhanced ener-
gy efficiency might cause electricity prices to decline. Lower 
electricity prices that then result in establishing a competitive 
advantage of Polish firms which in turn, might expand their 
businesses (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 14).  
As for the prospected impacts on the local job market, these 
prospects distinctively depend on the succeeding realization of 
one or the other scenario. In any case however are those projec-
tions purely positive as ‘the functioning of shale gas production 
facilities will increase the probability of job creation’ (Kosciusz-
ko Institute 2012: 15). Simply the forecasted quantitative effect 
varies along the scenarios: The minimum growth to be achieved 
as of the pessimistic scenario within the upcoming ten years 
would equal approximately 120,000 new jobs. Yet, employment 
might also accumulate by around 190,000 as of the optimistic 
scenario (Kosciuszko Institute 2012: 15).  
In conclusion, the presented analysis clearly outlines the un-
derlying political hopes for energy supply security in the first 
place but in fact, prosperity in the second place by further devel-
oping unconventional gas exploration and production in Poland. 
The Legal Framework  
With respect to the idea of fracturing unconventional gas from 
the shales as an apparently new process, the Republic of Poland 
currently ‘lacks separate legal regulations’ (Kosciuszko Institute 
2011: 175) that are directly addressing operations in terms of 
‘prospection, exploration and production of unconventional gas’ 
(Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 175). Hence, as for any business 
activity to be commenced in that field there are the same regula-
tions applicable as for those of conventional natural gas (Kosci-
uszko Institute 2011: 175). The Ministry of the Environment 
thereby represents the most important political body in granting 
concessions (KPMG 2012: 43). Moreover, with the beginning of 
the year 2012, new legislation regulations have come into force. 
In principle, the obligation for an operator to ‘obtain separate 
concessions’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 189), remains un-
touched. Nevertheless, the procedure itself in terms of granting a 
concession has changed – it envisages mandatory tender proce-
dures as of each area met by the concession. The fundamental 
aim is to achieve greater competition among those businesses 
that are applying for such a concession (Kosciuszko Institute 
2011: 189).  
The procedure of obtaining a concession  
The underlying legal frameworks when it comes to granting a 
concession are the Geological Law as well as the Freedom of 
Business Activities Act. However, due to missing information 
packages providing detailed information on statutory require-
ments on the one hand and an official form of applying for a 
concession on the other hand, each business operator literally 
prepares its own application form (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
176). Yet, according to the new legislation a separate chapter has 
been added which exclusively identifies ‘the issues related to the 
organization of a tender procedure’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
190). Those issues contain information on the terms of the pro-
cedure and its selection criteria, outlines the scope of information 
which needs to be included ‘in a notice of a procedure’ (Kosci-
uszko Institute 2011: 190) and highlights the obligations of the 
Minister of the Environment for communication (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 190).  
As for the filing of an application, it must be clear to the opera-
tor that an application will have better chances to effectively pass 
the application process, the more ‘thorough and exhaustive’ 
(Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 176) it is. As the process of conces-
sion granting depends to a great extent on exactly that exhaust-
iveness of the submitted application, they ‘should be filed in due 
advance before the intended date of commencement’ (Kosciusz-
ko Institute 2011: 176). In any case, the final concession will be 
granted by the Minister of the Environment. However, appropri-
ately cooperating public authorities are able to issue opinions, 
approvals as well as refusals by themselves to the respective 
Minister (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 176). The Minister himself 
on the other hand is according to the new legislation required to 
acquire those opinions, approvals or refusals prior to the actual 
opening of the tender procedure (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
190). 
Opinions issued may be used by the Minister as complemen-
tary materials whereas a refusal might identify a fundamental 
reason for the final refusal by the Minster to grant a concession. 
Nonetheless, both opinions and refusals are not of binding char-
acter (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 176). An approval in contrast, 
‘mandates the granting of consent for the operator to proceed 
with the contemplated licensed activities’ (Kosciuszko Institute 
2011: 176). Although not further specified whether or not an 
approval given by those authorities possesses binding character, 
it is to be assumed that an approval might not result in an ulti-
mate refusal by the Minister. 
Mandatory and environmental components  
Concessions may be granted for different types of activities 
such as ‘prospection or exploration or production of minerals 
from fields/sites’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 177). Apart from 
those activity types, both the Geological Law and the Business 
Activities Act require certain mandatory elements that need to be 
met by an application (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 177):  
 The applicant must define type and scope of those business 
activities that shall be met with the concession to be granted. 
 In addition, the applicant’s title – if existing – must be prov-
en to the use of geological information to the site where the 
activities ought to be pursued. If a title does not exist so far, 
an intention to acquire the respective one must be given. 
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 The duration of the concession including the specification of 
the supposed date to commence business activities needs to 
be presented. 
 To indicate that activities are to be performed properly, 
proving of sufficient financial resources available is required. 
 Once the application is filed, a stamp duty needs to be paid. 
In addition to the aforementioned legal frameworks, a third 
framework becomes applicable already prior to the actual open-
ing of the tender procedure: As of the environmental legislation, 
an environmental conditions decision is required (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 180, 190).  
In cases of licensed activities that ‘are qualified as having a 
significant potential impact on the environment’ (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 180), the environmental legislation demands both 
an environmental impact assessment and all installations being 
subject to investment inspection. Those inspections are being 
conducted by the environmental protection inspector who is in 
charge of ensuring compliance with environmental protection 
requirements (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 180).  
In the course of obtaining an environmental conditions deci-
sion, all environmental impacts that are likely to occur are identi-
fied. Besides, some business activities may also require an im-
pact assessment to be conducted in order to minimize the identi-
fied threats to the environment (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 180).  
The new legislation has set forth further requirements for the 
operator to meet: It is in the responsibility of an operator to 
identify areas that are ‘covered by special forms of protection’ 
(Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 190). Those special forms of protec-
tion may include the protection of nature or the protection of 
historical monuments. Additionally, any negative impact on the 
natural environment by conducting the intended business activi-
ties needs to be backed by specifying methods how to prevent 
and rectify those (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 190-191). 
The right of a business operator to produce 
Certainly, the extent to which an operator is guaranteed the 
succeeding right to produce after finishing the exploration on a 
special site, ‘appears to be a major issue under the New Legisla-
tion’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 191). It must be noted that 
priority rights do not explicitly exist with regards to production 
concessions. However, it is the Minister’s right to grant a conces-
sion bearing a ‘pre-emptive right’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
191). It is then that the operator is basically granted a ‘valid 
claim against the State Treasury’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 
186). This claim implies that the operator who has conducted the 
exploration of the mineral deposit and documented its geological 
specifics ‘has priority (…) over other operators’ (Kosciuszko 
Institute 2011: 186) with regards to the respective deposit. 
Moreover, the Geological Laws enacts an exclusive right for 
the operator to’ use the information (…) obtained for the purpose 
of production of minerals’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 187) for a 
period of five years (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 191). However, 
it is not clear if after the publication of the submission of an 
application for a concession for production purposes, other inter-
ested business operators would be allowed to file an application 
themselves. This uncertainty arises particularly with respect to 
the fact that each type of a concession is subject to a separate 
tender process. In any case, for the period of validity for the 
operator with the exclusive right of using its geological infor-
mation obtained, the Minister ‘will not be able to grant a conces-
sion to any other operator’ (Kosciuszko Institute 2011: 191).  
Hence, the transition process – proceeding from the exploration 
to the production stage – ‘is [basically] secured in favour of the 
business operator who explored the deposit in question’ (Kosci-
uszko Institute 2011: 187). 
From Euphoria to Realism 
The years 2006 and 2007 are considered to be the initial start-
ing points of the development of a potential shale gas industry in 
Poland. Within these years, the first 11 licenses have been grant-
ed to four different companies by the SCT (deputy minister for 
the environment) on behalf of the Polish State Treasury. This 
procedure is a usual one in Poland anchored in the local Geologi-
cal and Mining Law. At this stage licenses have been awarded 
very cheap without any sufficient guarantee of control with 
regard to the exploration. The Polish government asked for a 
price of around 100 Euros per square kilometre (Jędrysek, 2013).  
Subsequently, estimates of 5.3 trillion cubic meters natural gas 
reserves in Poland conducted by the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) in 2011 promptly resulted in a huge enthu-
siasm by both Polish politicians and national and international 
operating firms assuming a beneficial business in Poland. The 
estimated number equates nearly 900 times the Polish society’s 
consumption in 2010 (McClatchy, 2013). As a consequence, 
Poland became the country with the largest shale gas resources 
within the EU and started to grant licenses to search for shale gas 
to a number of companies.  
It is to emphasize again, that for Poland, such developments 
can have crucial influences on energy security. Coloured by a 
constant distrust of Russia with regard to energy resources ener-
gy security has a very special meaning for Poland. Prospects in 
this industry therefore strongly impact their interest in shale gas. 
In the light of interest three main basins can be determined – 
the Baltic Basin in the north, the Podlasie Basin in the east and 
east-central and Lublin located in the southeast of the country 
(Johnson & Boersma, 2012). The euphoria about the shale gas 
reserves have promptly been damped in a slight way when in 
2012 new estimates with stricter methodologies have been pub-
lished by the Polish Geological Institute (PIG) and the US Geo-
logical Survey. Accordingly, initially estimated figures decreased 
by a factor of seven to fifteen (Press Europ, 2012). This surpris-
ing development let potential operation companies question 
whether the investment of huge sums in test drillings still shows 
economically beneficial prospects for them. To achieve clarity 
and confidence in this manner, many experts in this field advised 
to conduct exploratory drillings as an only option to acquire first 
important information on the geological potential.  
At this point, it is to mention that shale gas exploration is a 
completely new industry for Poland. As the country is not able to 
prove sufficient hands-on experience, appropriate technology or 
even enough capital, it strongly depends on the expertise and 
capital of foreign firms in fracking – the key method for shale 
gas extraction, in particular North American companies which 
are supposed to be the most experienced ones. Consequently, the 
Polish government is keen to attract foreign firms in order to 
receive this urgently needed information. 
According to a leading Polish think tank, the Kosciuszko Insti-
tute, Poland would potentially drill an average of 500 wells per 
year (McClatchy, 2013). Media Reports and other sources show, 
that the initially assumed situation, however changed. In summer 
2011, gas-exploration companies planned to drill around 120 test 
wells within the coming years in order to assess if Poland effec-
tively has the largest reserves of shale gas (The Economist, 
2011). Nevertheless, only 33 test wells have been drilled over a 
period of three years and there is still no concrete result availa-
ble. So far, 111 exploration concessions have been awarded to 
about 30 companies, both state-owned and international, on a 
territory of more than 35,000 square miles, nearly a third of the 
country (McClatchy, 2013). A serious problem which Poland is 
currently confronted with is that major operating companies 
simply abandoned exploration in the last months. In October 
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2012, the US oil company ConocoPhillips opened up that it will 
not start operating in the eastern basin of Poland as the gas is 
considered to be of less quality compared to the western basins. 
Already three weeks prior to this announcement, also ExxonMo-
bil decided to pull out from Poland based on previous unsuccess-
ful tested wells that lack economic promises from the point of 
view of the company (PUNCH, 2012). At the same time, there 
were additional speculations about the Canadian Energy Compa-
ny Talisman objecting to sell off its Polish exploration licenses 
(McClatchy, 2013). In May 2013, the company finally left the 
Polish business. At the same time, Marathon Oil announced to 
sell its operations by 2014, as its Polish licenses are supposed to 
be less beneficial (Warsaw Business Journal, 2013). A year later, 
Total of France would also not renew its exploration license 
(Goclowski & Kahn, 2014). 
With these incidents, the uncertainty about the country’s shale 
gas future started to increase instead of the other way around as it 
was initially objected by Poland. Hence, Poland still does not 
have any reliable information on the potential to commercially 
produce shale gas. Still the quality of the gas and the extraction 
costs are widely unknown. Economic, political and environmen-
tal factors still left the country and its future planning with regard 
to unconventional energy in an uncertain situation. That puts 
more and more pressure on the government to undertake appro-
priate actions to shape the situation into a positive fashion. Reu-
ters estimates that not even one of the currently 40 operating test 
wells will start to produce gas before 2015 (Reuters, 2013). 
A Keen State-Business Relationship 
The government-business relationship in the context of shale 
gas operations is currently accompanied by a dense tension be-
tween investors and the country. It is not only the growing uncer-
tainty about the development of a shale gas industry in Poland 
and therefore the long desired independence from Russia that 
puts pressure on the Polish government, on the other side an 
uncertain and therefore unattractive legislation from an investor’s 
perspective have been the main sources provoking such a tension 
between state and business. In the focus of conflict, is the pro-
posal of a new shale gas regulation. 
It is to mention, that all geological deposits in Poland are state-
owned. Thus, the state strives for transparent approaches with 
regard to license ownership and the exploration process and also 
controllability. After granting the first licences in 2006/07, thus, 
Polish government initially aimed to develop new regulations 
and new laws which include beside other issues to establish a 
new special state agency. Today, Poland is still in the planning 
phase to set up the National Operator for Energy Resources, 
called NOKE (Jędrysek, 2013). In the frame of the new proposed 
shale gas law, this national operator represents one reason for the 
keen relationship between state and investors.  The reason behind 
is, that NOKE will have the right of first refusal to buy energy 
concessions on the secondary market and at the same time it will 
have stakes in the licenses. For investors this means being con-
fronted with higher costs and risks, as operating as both an inves-
tor and a regulator is a conflicting situation of interests 
(aktivist.pl, 2013).  
The main interests of investors are basically to have future se-
curity and stability. Generally, an investor would not start operat-
ing in such a business without being guaranteed any beneficial 
and reliable regulations. The state, however directs the law to 
government controlled geological and mining companies, such as 
PGNiG that is therefore currently the only active operator in 
Poland (Jędrysek, 2013). According to the Polish Exploration 
and production Industry Organization (OPPPW), the new pro-
posed hydrocarbon law may rather appear as an obstacle for 
speeding up the commercial production of natural gas than as a 
supporter. The Polish lobby group argues against the planned 
state-controlled company NOKE that is aimed to operate as a 
regulator for the industry. Referring to the new law proposal, this 
firm will hold small equity stakes in each concession. The lobby 
group represents the view that this kind of state intervention will 
on the one hand further extend the decision-making process in 
terms of time and on the other hand it also additionally limits 
available equity for other investors (E&P News, 2012). 
Media reports demonstrate further conflicts within the new 
shale gas regulation proposed by the government that do foster 
the tension between state and companies. In a consultation pro-
cess in March 2013, shale gas firms criticized the uncertainty 
which arises based on the law for them. The conflict particularly 
refers to the rule of establishing a tender for extraction licenses 
after test drills have been concluded. This leaves the companies 
uncertain about if they are allowed to generate profit within the 
same license they have initially invested in for test drillings 
(aktivist.pl, 2013). Moreover, the new regulations tend to be too 
bureaucratic in the eyes of investors which makes operating in 
Poland very unattractive for them.  
The government is in a weak position as it needs to attract for-
eign companies in order to speed up the development of the shale 
market. Moreover, investors need a stable legal environment and 
clear regulations that gives them the benefit of prediction. In this 
way they are able to conclude future costs and benefits and hence 
evaluate the potential risks. Being in a good bargaining position, 
companies consequently try to put pressure on the Polish gov-
ernment.  A report from the Warsaw Business Journal demon-
strates how firms urge the state to change regulations immediate-
ly. According to this report, shale gas firms have already been 
waiting for any change in law for three years. In the focus of 
tension between government and investors is the regulation 
introduced in 2010 that defines conditions for conducting drills 
deeper than 1,000 meters, what particularly Chevron aims to do. 
The conflicting issue deals with new permissions required for 
extending existing boreholes. Though Chevron claims in an 
official statement to not plan to withdraw from Poland, a Polish 
member of the European Parliament takes the existing risk very 
seriously and assumes that Chevron will be the fourth company 
withdrawing from Poland if the country will not conduct any 
change in law until the end of 2013 (Warsaw Business Journal, 
2013). Considering that at this time several countries like for 
instance France decided to ban hydraulic fracturing due to envi-
ronmental risks, this is indeed supposed to be a serious problem 
for Poland, as the European Union might create regulations that 
will influence the potential development of a shale gas industry 
in Poland in a negative way.  
As time was running in April 2013 and pressure on the state 
increased, the Polish government finally proposed regulations on 
shale gas exploration and production accordingly. Thus, the law 
lightens effort in bureaucratic issues with regard to environmen-
tal procedures which is aimed to encourage companies to con-
duct exploration works. Hence, to give an example, there is no 
additional permitting procedure required for the case of drilling 
wells deeper than actually agreed on (Cleantech Poland, 2013). 
In June 2013, another new version of the geology and mining law 
draft has been announced by the Polish Ministry of Environment 
to make a further step to meet the objectives of new investors 
concerning clarity. The established operator NOKE shall cap 
profit participation at 5 percent proportionally to costs (Cleantech 
Poland, 2013). In an interview with Bloomberg in June 2013, the 
Polish Treasury Minister Karpinski additionally intended to hush 
doubting investors that the shale gas business will remain in the 
primary focus of the state. According to him, Poland’s current 
priority is to focus on increasing hydrocarbon extraction. That 
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means that the government is keen to allocate all financial assets 
and investments to this project. Accordingly, there is a program 
called Polish Investments that provides Poland’s key investment 
projects with loans and guarantees from the state bank BGK 
which can potentially support the plans (Ministry of Treasury, 
2013). As Poland does not have sufficient financial resources in 
order to be able to finance the shale gas exploration, local com-
panies like PGNiG are additionally negotiating with foreign 
partners about works at their shale gas licenses. These are prima-
ry investors from North America (Natural Gas Europe, 2013). 
By means of the development of this conflicting relationship 
between government and investors and the resulting actions by 
the state, one can identify an incremental style by the govern-
ment. Decisions to meet the interests of investors are rather based 
on a try-and-find-out approach than on rational grounding. 
Putting Politics Ahead of Business 
While the Polish government is strongly focusing on shaping 
the relationship with its potential investors in a positive manner 
by changes in regulations, environmentalists and inhabitants, in 
particular farmers also raise their concerns about the fashion of 
action by the state and the new regulation. The basic problem is 
that the government is simply too enthusiastic about the potential 
freedom from Russian imports. In its ambition and enthusiasm to 
achieve independence from Russia the government considers 
important aspects in a so called tunnel vision which narrows their 
window of opportunity and blindly releases protests that harm 
the trust in the local authorities. Protests not only come from a 
national level, but also indirectly from the European Parliament 
when it comes to environmental harms. 
In order to make the public aware about the potential environ-
mental costs and risks associated with shale gas, the European 
Commission introduced three huge reports about impacts of shale 
gas on markets, environment and climate in September 2012. 
Within the frame of the environmental impact study, the Com-
mission stated that shale gas extraction is generally more harmful 
to the environment than conventional gas extraction. On the other 
hand, the report on climate impact showed results in favour of 
shale gas extraction. Accordingly, greenhouse gas emissions 
from shale gas are supposed to be two percent to ten percent 
lower than emissions from electricity generated from conven-
tional pipeline gas and seven to ten percent lower than that from 
LNG. Further environmental risk areas associated with the ex-
traction method of shale gas that environmentalists and particu-
larly inhabitants and farmers fear, are air and noise pollution, 
groundwater and surface water contamination and biodiversity. 
This has risky influences on the environment and health of indi-
viduals (Johnson & Boersma, 2012). 
After EU energy commissioner Günther Oettinger made it 
clear in 2011 that the European Commission is debating about a 
European regulatory framework on shale gas production, Reuters 
assumed that Poland will veto any EU anti-shale gas moves that 
potentially limit the industry’s development in the country 
(Reuters, 2011). As predicted, in April 2012 a Polish MEP sub-
mitted a report vetoing new regulations on shale gas and claim-
ing that they are not necessary (Polskie Radio, 2012). Conse-
quently, according to a press release in November 2012, Poland 
required a moratorium on the rock fracturing technology used in 
shale gas production in the entire European Union, but the Par-
liament responded with rejection of this inquiry. In a press con-
ference, Prime Minister Donald Tusk told “We will be persistent-
ly trying to show Europe that production of shale gas makes 
sense” (Automated Trader, 2012).  
The foundation “Czysta Energia” points out that Poland does 
not play a fair game. On the one hand, Poland does not conduct 
sufficient environmental studies and on the other hand the envi-
ronmental offices are not even able to evaluate the projects from 
an environmental perspective due to non-existent adequate tools 
to do so (aktivist.pl, 2013). Currently biggest operating compa-
nies in the field of shale gas exploration in Poland are state-
owned firms like PGNiG, copper miner KGHM or PKN Orlen. 
The fact that some of them have no experience with energy 
exploration (BBC News, 2013) shows indication that the Polish 
government puts politics ahead of industry expertise.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. “Polish Gas – Good Gas” website at lupkipolskie.pl It 
is available in English (polishshalegas.pl), German, French and 
Spanish, demonstrating a mission to attract international inves-
tors but also to take the pro-shale message abroad. The website 
is managed by PGNiG but co-sponsored by the government. 
 
According to environmentalists, the proposed legislation men-
tioned above appeared as an attempt by the government to avoid 
an anti-shale gas movement in advance. Within the proposal in 
question, environmental organizations only get permission to 
participate in environmental permitting process, if they have 
been in existence for at least twelve months (Cleantech Poland, 
2013). It seems that the Polish government tries to accelerate its 
Niemuth & Westphal: Blind Politics of Ambition – Shale Gas in Poland  
 
JEMPAS   45 
 
exploitation plans on shale gas by limiting and silencing potential 
internal opposition and minimizing regulations, so that investors 
are easier to attract. Green opponents, however, actively respond 
to this approach of the Polish government.  
The Polish climate Coalition, which is the largest coalition of 
environmental organisations within the country, acts against the 
state by blaming it for acting against democracy and transparen-
cy, which is an abuse of civil rights.  This movement let Poland 
shine in a negative light, especially as it damaged trust in the 
local authorities (Natural Gas Europe, 2013). This might further 
narrow the window of opportunities for the Polish government, 
as it shall act in the interest of the society. But if trust is dam-
aged, more protests against will occur more and more which 
brings Poland not only in a conflicting situation with potential 
investors but also with its society.  
The recent “Occupy Chevron” movement additionally mirrors 
the problem of a growing mistrust of the civil society in Polish 
authorities. Since June 2013, local farmers start to protest against 
Chevron as they fear a huge potential contamination of the farm-
land. It was the Ministry of Environment that allowed Chevron to 
conduct tests on leased land, though it has no local permission to 
undertake such actions. According to “Occupy the Pipeline” 
farmers now fear uncontrolled fracking operations by Chevron 
and therefore protest. The company did not complete the permis-
sion procedure. This indicates again that the Polish government 
is disposed to ignore certain regulations and procedures in order 
to achieve the goal of being independent from Russia (Occupy 
the pipeline, 2013). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. “Let’s Talk About Shales” campaign website, 
gazlupkowy.pl, also published in English (polishshale.pl). 
 
In July 2013, the Polish government responded to critics in an 
attempt to rebuild trust of the society with the campaign “Let’s 
talk about shales”. This campaign primary focussed on local 
residents near shale gas exploration sites but also on all stake-
holders, aims to give the opportunity to establish a dialogue with 
the society and in this way gives them a chance to raise their 
opinion concerning shale gas extraction, especially in northern 
Poland. “Let’s talk about shales” includes a website with online 
consultations and also the organization of public hearings. The 
website basically provides informative material including both 
technical and environmental aspects of shale gas operations. The 
campaign will last until the end of 2013, when representatives of 
the Ministry of Environment plan to develop a public document 
that reveals the most important needs, expectations, hopes and 
concerns of all stakeholders and necessary actions to undertake 
in the future (Ministry of Environment, 2013).  
This campaign, however, should be considered critically, as 
the Ministry of Environment strongly supports shale gas produc-
tion and as learned from past actions always tries to shape regu-
lation in a way to speed up the commercial production by attract-
ing new investors. Hence, this might be a further attempt by the 
state to achieve its goal by silencing and calming down internal 
opponents. On the other hand, this can also be an indication of a 
learning process by the government that might re-expand the 
window of opportunities for the Polish shale gas industry soon. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper basically analysed why until now the 
development of a shale gas industry in Poland is still stocking by 
covering critical aspects of the legal framework in combination 
with the policy background, the relations between government 
and business and socio-economic impacts. Basic sources of 
concern include a difficult geology in Poland combined with an 
uncertain regulatory environment. The illustrated delay in as-
sessment of the actual amount of reserves still leaves Poland in 
doubt whether the industry could ever be commercially viable.  
Several foreign operators have withdrawn from Poland, which 
makes the situation for the government and the prospect to be-
come a successful actor and achieve independence from Russia 
more disappointing and at the same time very keen.  
It has to be pointed out, that the government acted too hasty 
and blindfold in the past when it comes to licensing. This already 
started in 2007, when the first licenses have been awarded to 
investors. Generally, a government would not grant any licenses 
without control and even for almost free, but being in the posi-
tion of the Polish government, which is still in an urgent need of 
the expertise of foreign companies, it was not surprising that in 
2007 licenses were granted to foreign firms without any guaran-
tee of control with regard to the exploration and almost for free 
for around 100 Euros per square kilometre. This was probably 
the only appropriate strategy to conduct at this stage in order to 
capture important investors.  
Nevertheless, the Polish government did one crucial mistake in 
this context. It granted all 115 available licenses in the same 
manner. It would have been done better by having employed this 
strategy in a limited fashion up to a certain amount. The conse-
quence of Poland’s mistake is basically the lost control over the 
ownership of the licenses. ExxonMobil for instance just moved 
to Ukraine and Russia and might now share gas deposits with its 
Russian counterpart (Jędrysek, 2013). The likelihood of this case 
is questionable, but the risk is present that they share shale oil 
fields located in Poland. The Polish government did plenty of 
mistakes in its attempt and enthusiasm to establish a footprint in 
that industry. It tried to shape the rules in an incremental way and 
tried to exclude local NGOs from the participation in decisions 
concerning shale gas exploration. It does not only put politics 
ahead of every other business, but even ahead of its own people. 
Trust in authorities of state collapsed. Thus, the results of its 
blind action in its ambition to become independent of Russia are 
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significant – financial losses and broad economic and social 
negative effects. As a consequence Poland still does not have any 
idea how much oil and gas the country can provide. Clear indica-
tions with regard to efficiency, geology and appropriate technol-
ogies are still lacking.  
Looking to the future, prospected impacts of a gas market lib-
eralization in Poland stated in this paper emphasise that such a 
business appears to most essential for the country. Hence, efforts 
are expected to be made by applying the principle of economic 
optimization. Making Poland become independent of foreign gas 
supply – in addition to its potential future role as a gas provider 
for the European market itself – considerably addresses the dy-
namic of the resource-power-interdependence: Taking over a 
lead role in the unconventional gas extraction and production 
will seriously contribute to strengthen Poland’s political im-
portance across Europe. 
Without any modification of the hydrocarbon law, business 
planning for investors will remain problematic. Shale gas explor-
ers are – though impatient - waiting for changes in legislative by 
the Polish government. Moreover, the Polish government will 
have to follow the obligations of European legislation for the 
internal market of gas. In consideration of the fact that Polish 
officials seem to be the only advocates in Brussels, the European 
Commission also should invest effort in motivating Poland to 
implements demanded legislation as soon as possible. 
If the Polish government continues distracting urgently needed 
foreign companies with expertise in shale gas exploration activi-
ties, generating advantages and benefits and becoming a leader in 
the unconventional gas extraction and production will almost be 
impossible and a development of the desired shale gas industry 
will further slow down. This future prospect highlights the inter-
dependence between resource and power. 
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